Discrepancies from the Argument of Human Inconceivability (with regard to theology)
I discussed the argument of Human Inconceivability in a previous article of mine, but I shall here briefly talk about it, and the possible arguments that can follow from it. I do not prescribe to the arguments that follow as being necessary but only as being probable, since my philosophic knowledge is, as of current, limited and therefore insufficient to deem what that which is the necessary step to take from the Human Inconceivability. Yet, I am sure that this is my little philosophic revolution.
The argument from Human Inconceivability has its prefix in the argument from ignorance, but uses this seemingly awkwardness to its advantage by ascribing it to human’s insufficiency to comprehend the mind of God. It argues that it is simpler that there is the non-existence of all things and of nothingness itself, than the existence of all things and nothingness itself. Since this begs the question of why there exists in the first place, it puts humans into the prime position of the argument wherein we, created in the image of God and specially created for his liking, have minds that are insufficient in comprehending the non-existence of all things and of nothingness itself, thus concluding that God must necessarily exist in order to cause the existence of what that which exists.
I suppose that the issue at hand is the notion of the relation between conceivability and necessity. For if something is deemed unconceivable, must it be that an unknown thing, which is by its very nature unknowable, necessarily be the causal agent? As in the history of science, this is not true. There exist innumerable accounts wherein due to the insufficient knowledge and technology of the people of the time, what was not understandable then was therefore promptly prescribed to divine cause. An obvious example was the lack of understanding that
Yet, is it not possible that the mind be differentiated into two ‘mediums’ – one being of the intellect, and the other of the nature of the human mind? In the case of the intellect, its precepts, these being of mathematical thinking, are eternally true, and therefore pertain to the characteristic of what that which is infinite, though not unconceivable. For the human mind, it has been once argued by philosophers/ theologians that due to the fact that the human mind is constrained by nature, where there only exists, it is thus by this very nature that it is incapable of conceiving the supernatural – the mind of God – and the non-existence of all things and of nothingness thereafter. The human brain, therefore, is not characteristic of what that which is infinite in supernatural comprehension. That is, while the human brain has parameters that disallow supernatural comprehension, the intellect is of an infinite continuum, since it has its prefixes in mathematics. In all this, however, it is assumed that God pertains to what that which is infinite and inconceivable – which is the non-existence of all things and of nothingness itself. Theologians/ philosophers may now speak of their belief in that wisdom, or the intellect, is divinely given, while the human brain is supernaturally constrained, thus making this a case for the existence of the soul or the spirit. Yet, is it reasonable to assume that the intellect and the nature of the human mind are of different things, that one is not characteristic of what that which is infinite while the other is? As in science, this is not the case.
Both scholars and scientists know of innumerable empirical experimentations and observations regarding how the intellect is intimately linked with the human mind, that is, by its very definition, the human brain. For example, there exists a report [1] documenting how the damage to the left angular gyrus region of the brain causes an incapacity for interpreting metaphors. It is an instance wherein damage to the human brain, or the human mind, induces a deficiency in abstract thinking, and thus to the intellect. Also, by observing quantitative behavior of the brain when applying abstract rules to medial tasks, scientists have observed [2] higher activity in certain neurons of the prefrontal cortex. Though this may only be a correlation, it nevertheless reveals that the human intellect is very much dependent upon the behavior of individual neurons, or that both are of the same thing. Therefore, it must be drawn from this that the intellect and the human brain are united in some way or another, and thus that infiniteness of the intellect is true even unto the human brain itself. The only issue at hand that supports theology is the notion of conceivability. That is, despite both the human mind and the intellect having the characteristic of what that which is infinite, both nevertheless remain incapable of conceiving the non-existence of all things and of nothingness itself. At least, however, it seems likely that God only pertains to what that which is inconceivable, rather than what that which is infinite.
Before we draw further conclusions about the plausibility at hand, we must first outline what existence pertains to and what the supposed parameters of the human mind are. We must acknowledge that what that which exists must have meaningful attributes so that we may distinguish one from the other, thereby understanding what ‘actually’ exists and what not. Therefore, what that which has attributes can be considered a thing – such as a thought or an act.
Therefore, the argument reads in translated version:
“It is simpler for the non-existence of what that which has meaningful attributes and of that which has no meaningful attributes at all, than for the existence of what that which has attributes and that which has no meaningful attributes at all. Since the human mind is capable of only comprehending the existence of what that which has meaningful attributes, due to the very definition of its natural parameters, and that since the definition of God pertains to what that which is infinite or unconceivable, and since the simpler must be true, God therefore exists.”
We must first recognize before further analysis that God is what that which in infinite and inconceivable, thus pertaining to the definition of having no meaningful attributes. When meaning is talked about, it is also in relation to the human being, and thus that God cannot give us meaningful information about himself to us (use of the pronoun ‘him’ is ONLY for convenience’s sake). Notice, however, that on the first line of the argument, it states, by partition of key portions, that it is simpler for the non-existence of what that which has no attributes – or that which is inconceivable. That is, it is simpler for that God does not exist, or for any other of which that is in relation to or related to God by the characteristics of being infinite or inconceivable – such as Satan, Heaven and Hell. Yet, it also states that what that which has meaningful attributes is simpler to not have existed, that is, what that which contains energy and/or matter. Simply, that non-existence is simpler than existence. The argument is in its simplest of form self-refuting, and in its theologically applied form meaningless. It seems that it would be simpler that the argument be inconceivable, which is in itself utterly absurd and ridiculous!
Initially, the argument seems to have committed the ignorance fallacy. However, by complex manipulation to the definition of the notion of ‘things’, it seems that not only is the argument self-effacing, but also empty. Such is the credulity of theology when proving God’s existence!
Footnotes
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