On Divinity and the Prospects of a Democratic Character - a Dilemma

For we know that in reality – physical reality – that a pure democracy ceases to function due its surmounting contradictions, yet it is assumed that under the characteristics of a deity, such contradictions are only but illusory. For, it is argued, that since deities are greater than that of reality, no worldly reason or irreason thus applies to divinity. I shall show here that, in relation to physical reality, such is but of the authority fallacy, but that such views on the character of divine forms are democratic by nature is hanging.

The most direct and simplest of objection to such a view is that if we arrive by human reason that divinity is exempted from the issues of mere humans the issue of reason, the statement refutes itself. For if reason were itself formulated by humans – the field of dependent and independent logic, and the sufficiency and necessity of premises and the validity – then it makes no sense for exemption for it would make the statement meaningless. That is, if divinity is exempted from reason, or worldly reason, and that since this statement is innately worldly reason, then divinity cannot necessarily be allowed for such exemption. Because to allow it would be to first permit the use of it. An inherent contradiction exists.

The more sophisticated rebuttal to this is that of the second premise – the democratic nature of divinity. That is, it would only initially seem that pure democracy is only suitable for the divine, not mere mortals. The problem comes at the proposition that all members of this democratic regime enjoy equal freedom. These members are we mere mortals. That is, in the perspective of the divine, humans are all equally permitted to the freedom and equality. In so, such members enjoy the same benefits these privileges give rise to. Yet, it seems that such a regime does not seem to be operating at the level of nature itself – including human nature and their relative worldly conditions.

For if taken democratic principles as the moral take for divinity, all human beings must necessarily be equally free and thus be able to enjoy the various acts or things of interest at equal opportunity and privilege. From here it must then be insisted that free-will necessarily exists due to the premise of the presence of a democratic divinity. Then, if pure freedom exists, or the essence of arbitrary decision-making exists, then the processes contained within the world are necessarily incomplete when contemplated only in view of natural law. The discontinuity of natural things thus permits the occurrence of miracles or unexplained phenomena. Two points are to be noted here. First, that it is assumed that democratic principles are the most perfect among all other principles of other varying political ideologies. Second, the question of whether freedom to choose exists is begging. The first note I shall deal with in the near future. The second note shall be dealt with here in great length.

We take that if some divinity exists, and it formed the physical reality as it is right now, then all occurrences within nature are thus the eternal and unbroken decree from the divine. Therefore, whatever environment, culture, society, or time period a human being is born into is thus pre-determined by this divinity. A question arises. So is choice solely dependent upon the natural surroundings, or both natural surroundings and free will? Such is the dilemma is alluded to on the above. The answer comes from whether democratic principles are perfect. That is, if divinity is perfect, that its will is also therefore perfect – and therefore its act of causation or formation is perfect – whether a democracy best fits the notion of divine perfection.